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Abstract—The emergence of big data analytics enables real
time news analysis. Such analysis offers the possibility to in-
stantly extract the sentiment conveyed by any newly published,
textual information source. This paper investigates the existence
of a causal relationship between news sentiment and stock
prices. As such, we apply news sentiment analysis for un-
structured, textual data to extract sentiment scores and utilize
the Granger-causality test to determine the causal relationship
between daily news sentiment scores and the corresponding
stock market returns. Upon successfully identifying such a
causal relationship with a time lag, we develop a real-time
news sentiment index. This news sentiment index serves as
a decision-support system in detecting a potential over- or
undervaluation of stock prices given the news sentiment of
available news sources. Thus, as a novelty, the news sentiment
index serves as an early-warning system to detect irrational
exuberance.
1. Introduction
One of the underlying assumptions of economic theory is
informational efficiency. Informational efficiency relates to
the fact that investors endogenize all available information
into their buy- or sell-decisions and thus reflect all available
information in market prices. While the classical economic
approaches assume perfect informational efficiency as stip-
ulated in the efficient market hypothesis, the field of behav-
ioral economics examines in numerous contributions how
and why human behavior in market interactions undermines
complete informational efficiency [1]–[3].
In fact, every economist would like to know what will
happen tomorrow in the economy. However, despite different
behavioral anomalies affecting human decision-making as
outlined by behavioral economics research e.g. [4], [5],
making robust predictions of future economic developments
is a huge challenge both in academic research and financial
markets.
Such predictions of future events become less accurate the
further we go into the future. In order to develop predictions,
economists use knowledge they acquired in the past to
detect certain recurring patterns and relationships among
the observed variables. This econometric knowledge then
effectively translates into extrapolating certain patterns into
the future, expecting these historic processes to repeat with a
certain probability. In the context of analyzing ever growing
data sources of different data variety (e.g. qualitative and
quantitative, structured and unstructured data), big data
analytics and data science have developed novel approaches
to analyze data faster, integrate more varied data sources
and run analytics models more accurately, such as machine
learning [6], [7].
We have learned that certain events trigger or influence
other events, for example the negative causality of inflation
and unemployment, or interest rates and exchange rates.
Consequently, such insights enable us to understand
relationships of relevant economic factors. However, when
evaluating empirical data and moving from such abstracted,
isolated bilateral relationships to economic behavior
observed in markets with a multitude of stakeholders,
external and internal influencing factors come into play and
contribute to the complexity of economic predictive and
forecasting analysis.
To get an insight into the state our economy is in, and
to anticipate future events, one approach is to account for
government statistics or market data, such as earning reports
of stock-listed companies, which typically get published
with significant time lags. Hence, predictions on the basis
of such data imply a certain time-lag between the point
in time to which such data points refer to, and the point
in time at which the data is published in order to make a
prediction of future events.
One alternative approach is to rely on data with smaller
or virtually no time lag. One such approach is to poll
the moods and expectations of subjects working in the
economy, namely bankers, managers, analysts, brokers,
CEOs or companies. Such indices are often published
by country, industry or value chain function, such as
procurement. Examples include the PMI on either a global
scale or, or for specific region (e.g. USA, Japan, UK) and
the ifo Index or ZEW in Germany [8]–[10]. Those are
updated monthly and well publicized via all different types
of German media. It polls the sentiment of firms based in
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the construction industry, manufacturing industry, retail and
wholesale business and summarizes their expectations of
the current state of the economy and expected development
of the next month [11].
However, the ifo Index in its structure rarely surprises
us with early insights of emerging events [12]. This
weakness of the ifo, is due to its survey based structure.
None of the surveyed individuals will share expectations
on the economy, which they have not yet translated into
actions respectively prices for themselves. The ifo is
an index of information that is already priced in. Even
with their inside knowledge they themselves are victims
of ’irrational exuberance’ which makes their survey
answers biased. Therefore, we must search an unbiased
instrument which allows us to detect emerging ’economic
bubbles’ and irrational exuberance as early as possible [13].
For that reason, this paper shall focus on finding a
new instrument to forecast price developments of a stock
market index through the sentiment contained in stock-
relevant financial disclosures of the companies listed in a
specific index, in order to find an early-warning indicator
and develop a new type of sentiment index. This sentiment
analysis approach allows us to tap into a new source of
sentiment data, allowing us to modulate the sentiment of
a business area in real time. To do so, we introduce the
literature and ideas on which we base our research in section
2. In section 3 we present the news source, which we
analyze in section 4 with text mining to transform it into
a usable form and describe how we apply the Granger-
causality method. The statistical analysis will be performed
in section 5, for the whole data and for sequential subsets.
Section 5 will also include the psychological interpretation
of our results and the search for ’irrational exuberance’.
Section 6 deals with the evaluation of our findings and the
development of the new economic index. The advantages of
this index and an outlook for future research will be included
in the concluding sections 7 and 8.
2. Related Work
In this section we introduce the literature on which we base
our analysis and compare the approach we take with related
work of this field. Based on the literature and the idea for
our research, we will derive our two research questions.
2.1 Literature on Economic Indices
The original idea to search for a source of unbiased senti-
ment derives from Tetlock, Feuerriegel and Hagenau [14]–
[16], who introduced the concept of investigating ’whether
news momentum can predict medium-term stock index de-
velopment’. Following the idea of Hagenau’s paper’s title
’Reading All The News at the Same Time’, we analyze news
to extract sentiment values. The focus in doing so is not
based on how a breaking news announcement influences
the short-term stock return [17], [18], or to predict the
stock markets volatility [19]. Nether do we test noise trade
methods, based on sentiment data [20].
Our interest lies in finding a medium-term causal relation-
ship between the stock indices and news sentiments. Similar
to the CrisisModeler by Holopainen and Sarlin [21], our
objective is to find an instrument, that indicates an emerging
crisis. While they build a web-based crisis modeling applica-
tion with the ability of finding early warning signs, but as a
more general modeling solution and for crisis prediction, our
interest lies in finding a sentiment instrument to detect the
first signs of ’irrational exuberance’ in financial markets. A
more micro-economic warning mechanism can be found in
the work of Betz et al. [22], where the early warning model
is not only for an economic region, but specific for banks and
their vulnerability to emerging crisis, due to country-specific
and bank-specific risks measures. An approach, more similar
to our sentiment instrument is utilized by Jansen et al. [23],
which studies the influence of consumer confidence on short
term stock market development for different countries in the
EU. They also use the Granger-causality test in order to find
a delayed influence on stock market pricing, but don’t search
for the specific causal lags but look for a direct and 30 day
causality. We will test for more particular significant lag
sequences and test if they change over time.
Furthermore, we will include a behavioristic analysis, to
determine whether the differences between the sentiment’s
movement and those of the stock market follow a principle
that can be psychologically explained. This analysis will
be based on Shiller’s search for ’irrational exuberance’ and
include several cognitive biases to explain different behavior
between our time series [13].
2.2 Research Question
If we combine the concept of the empirical search for a
causal relationship between the market’s news sentiment and
the CDAX, and the cognitive biases regarding an explanation
of investors, reaction to news, we end up with two questions,
for which we aim to find the answers.
The research question for this paper can be summed up as:
1) Is there a causal relationship between news sentiment
and the German stock market?
2) Can we identify a delay between the estimated news




The source of sentiment data we use are corporate announce-
ments instead of journalistic news. One reason for this is
that news about the fundamentals of a company are a better
source for predicting earnings and returns of companies [24].
The other purpose is to tap into a trustworthy and non-biased
source for new information regarding the economic situation
and development of a certain company.
The news announcements we analyze contain information
which were not publicly announced before and as a conse-
quence are not yet represented in stock prices. These cor-
porate announcements are of a regulatory nature, meaning
reports of the companies status, earning reports, announce-
ments for future plans and ad-hoc publications of voting
share developments, all according to the Wertpapierhandels-
gesetz (WpHG). This includes annual and half-year financial
statements plus additional financial reports regarding the
company transparency. We expect the tone of these ad-
hoc news to be more neutral and therefore more likely to
represent the real news’s meaning.
With this in mind, and given the exclusive use of first-hand
news, we do not need to control for exuberant feedback
loops, the staggering effect of positive news only triggered
by previous positive news, vice versa. All the analyzed news
items, we use in this paper, are taken from German stock
companies without exclusions, published between January
2004 and July 2011 through the DGAP. The data set consists
of 14427 individual news reports on 2013 days in our ob-
servation period. Since we are looking for causality between
these news and related quantifiable economic figures such
as stock index, we will use the Composite DAX (CDAX).
The CDAX includes all German stock companies.
4. Text Mining, Sentiment Analysis and
Causality
This section introduces the methods used to generate our
data set and how we are going to analyze it. Text mining is
the first step to generate the analyzable sentiment values for
every CDAX ad-hoc news announcement. We also take the
CDAX for that period. The second step is to introduce the
Granger-causality method which we will use to determine
if and how the causal relationship between both time series
occurs.
4.1 Sentiment Analysis and Data Set
Sentiment analysis refers to the analytical method which
interprets the meaning of every word through an either
positive or negative value. In order to generate these
sentiment scores, we need to prepare the text corpus of the
news we want to analyze. Therefore, we start by tokenizing
the text [25], detecting and inverting negation [26] and
removing stop words [27]. Finally, we perform stemming
for the remaining text with the Porter stemming algorithm
[28] to generate our final text corpus.
In order to create reproducible sentiment scores [29]
and due to the very robust results found by Liebmann
[30], we use the Net-Optimism metric [31] combined with
Henry’s Finance-Specific Dictionary [32]. The sentiment
scores S(A) in this method are calculated as the difference
of positive Wpos(A) and negative Wneg(A) words, divided





∈ [−1+1] . (1)
In the next section the sentiment value S(A) for every
text corpus of the data set will be used to determine whether
we can find a causal relationship between it and the stock
market.
4.2 Causality
To determine the causal relationship between the sentiment
and the CDAX, ((news sentiment → CDAX), we will first
plot both vectors over time (Figure 1) and scan for an
observable dependence or causality. In section 5 we will
analyze their relationship empirically.
For Figure 1, we have plotted the de-trended time series
of the sentiment values and the CDAX. The sentiment values
are the daily aggregated news sentiment which is smoothed
with a moving average of 100. The sentiment values and the
CDAX have been standardized to plot them together. If we
inspect the two time series we can see a similar course for
both, from which we can assume that a causal relationship
exists. This assumed causality is not immediate, but occurs
after a delay of some length. Also the delay seems to change
over time. To confirm this theory and identify how big the
delay is, we introduce, as our tool, the Granger-causality
method.
4.3 Granger-Causality-Model
For the Granger-causality test we use the traditional bivariate
approach, as developed by Granger [33]. The basis for
the bivariate OLS autoregression is including the particular
autoregressive lags p for both vectors
xt = c1 + α1xt−1 + α2xt−2 + ...+ αpxt−p
+β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + ...+ βpyt−p + ut.
(2)















































































Figure 1. Aggregated, de-trended and Standardized Sentiment
Values (red), CDAX (black)
H0 : β1 = β2 = ... = βp = 0 (3)
meaning y does not Granger-cause x and
H1 : {β1, ..., βp} 6= 0 (4)
meaning y does Granger-cause x.
The F-test statistic (S1) will be calculated with the




= û2t , (5)
and is compared to the RSS of a univariate autoregression
for








RSS1/ (T − 2p− 1)
, (7)
needs to be higher than 1%, 5%, 10% critical value
for a F (p, T − 2p − 1) to reject the H0 hypothesis that
y do not Granger-cause x. The test, even though only
asymptotically valid, is enough to determine if a causal
relationship exists [33]–[35].
With this model we will work in the next section to
determine whether we can find evidence for a causal
relationship between the news sentiment and the CDAX.
5. Applied Granger-Causality
After discovering signs of causality in Figure 1 we are now
applying the Granger-causality method, which was discussed
in the last section, with the aim of finding empirical evi-
dence. Until now, we can only assume what kind of lags
we have to deal with. However, Granger causality requires
an exact lag to calculate the F-statistics and p-values. In
order to identify the causal relationship, find the particular
lags and prove the hypothesis that the sentiment causes
the CDAX, we use a for-loop to repeatedly calculate the
multiple Granger-causality test from one lag, up to 360th
lags.
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5.1 Applied Causality to CDAX
For the application of the Granger-causality test, we have
to meet the requirements for OLS models. The time series
model we work with is non-stationary, due to the autocor-
relation in the CDAX and in sentiment values, which are
highly autocorralated for more than 100 lags. To still be
able to continue the empirical research we will use a lower
moving average of 29 (maximum number of aggregated
monthly observations) to level down the autocorrelation
of the sentiment series. A further way to deal with non-
stationary time series in a bivariate Granger-causality test, is
to proceed as [36]–[38] did, and also calculate the Granger-
causality for first differences of the de-trended time series.
The results for both test-loops, if and for which lag our news
sentiment (y) causes CDAX (x), y→ x are shown in Figure
2
























Figure 2. Granger-Causality P-Values for their Respective Lags, for
the Standard Time Series and the First Differences
The answer as to whether the sentiment causes a CDAX’s
reaction and how many days later it reacts on the news
sentiment can be answered by the significant lag(s) in
the Granger-causality test. In Figure 2, we can clearly
identify several windows of significant lags. The window of
significant values for the first differences often lies within
those of the standard values. Due to the significance in
whole sequences of lags in both models, we can reject H0
and say that the causality of y → x exists (RQ1) and that
its lag is in between one to seven months long. Given the
nature of regression, it is always an analysis of means,
which is also the case for the Granger-causality. This means
that the average causal lag is between 31 and 199 days, and
for the first differences between 40 and 115 days. Based
on this wide range of significant test results and the visual
appearance, with some major- and some minor-appearing
delays, we can assume a shift of causal lags through time,
with the average lags displayed in Figure 2.
Anticipating the psychological arguments from Shiller
[13], Welch and Bikhchandani [39], [40], and the results
and conclusion of the test above we have to add a third
research question.
3) How does the causal reaction delay change over time?
In order to investigate this hypothesis, we split the time
series into four intervals and analyzed the sequences we
created. The four intervals reflect a ’pre-crisis’ (12. Feb
2004 – 15. Nov 2005), ’boom’ (16. Nov 2005 – 27. Aug
2007), ’peak and collapse’ (28. Aug 2007 – 09.Jun 2009)
and ’post-crisis’ (10. Jun 2009 – 27. Jun 2011) periods.
This process shrinks our observation subsets to 4 times
447, due to moving averages and several invalid entries.
For the four new sub-time series, we are also calculating
the Granger-causality, just as we did for the whole data. We
are taking the non-stationary data, due to its more sensitive
appearing p-values. Its p-values and lags are displayed in
Table I.
The sequential Granger-causality-test provides enough
evidence to support the theory of shifting lags. We can
identify four smaller windows of causality within the
second and third sequence of the first 90 lags. Based on
Figure 1 and 2 we would assume that also higher lags are
significant, especially in the first and fourth sequence, but
the Granger-causality test only allows us to test for lags
p ≈ 100 and lower, due to the lower number of observations
(n/4) and the regression-based test method, where we use
p ∗ 2 regressors (see Equation (2)).
Nevertheless, this test confirms the hypothesis of a shifting
lag through the period of our observation. In the ’Boom’
period and in the ’post-crisis’ period, we can measure a
low lagged causality, which we weren’t able to measure for
the period of ’boom’ and the ’peak and collapse’.
Overall we have proven: Research Question (RQ) 1 that
based on the results displayed in Figure 2 and Table I our
news sentiment Granger-causes the CDAX. Furthermore, we
have proven the first part of RQ 3 that the lags change
over time. Next, we will check if we can find evidence for
irrational exuberance that supports the causality we found.
5.2 Interpretation of Results
The Granger-causality test has confirmed the hypothesis of
lagged and shifting causality, but how can we explain and
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Table I
GRANGER-CAUSALITY P-VALUES FOR THE FOUR
SPLIT-SEQUENCES. FURTHER NO SIGNIFICANT LAGS UNTIL LAG 90
HAVE BEEN OMITTED.
Sequential Granger-Causality-Test Results
Lag Pre-crisis Boom Peak and Collapse Post-crisis
1 0,739186713 0,317086723 0,173200349 0,894068372
2 0,259705621 0,404389543 0,308727406 0,440906866
3 0,203187245 0,401557282 0,48997493 0,66011996
4 0,075723873 (*) 0,243863375 0,47436175 0,74015266
5 0,118608799 0,029464127 (**) 0,33678787 0,85823339
6 0,162156779 0,017391714 (**) 0,05387725 (*) 0,92471308
7 0,082115279 (*) 0,027118787 (**) 0,05443591 (*) 0,859612
8 0,12783948 0,037719704 (**) 0,08392403 (*) 0,87727711
9 0,23609379 0,062486676 (*) 0,06847618 (*) 0,88999865
10 0,302819936 0,096142779 (*) 0,04695134 (**) 0,91826532
11 0,387423254 0,07834239 (*) 0,04880278 (**) 0,7893059
12 0,42135956 0,08072422 (*) 0,04414824 (**) 0,82886693
13 0,52742917 0,101871265 0,05506312 (*) 0,88989791
14 0,60674901 0,167862325 0,08357291 (*) 0,91744949
15 0,664393483 0,136547494 0,06068459 (*) 0,95520553
16 0,594241502 0,186630212 0,06407783 (*) 0,97813108
17 0,499312711 0,234828407 0,1093751 0,98759885
18 0,463818013 0,25812963 0,16330707 0,99249139
19 0,552530818 0,07035775 (*) 0,2144849 0,94567643
20 0,279041307 0,097381613 (*) 0,25263342 0,95435524
21 0,477116508 0,078661069 (*) 0,30920223 0,96498079
22 0,409590213 0,096366626 (*) 0,31625965 0,96493442
23 0,486163451 0,100905882 0,28270996 0,94083541
24 0,488800483 0,124795073 0,31671009 0,55406512
25 0,541531178 0,161230164 0,32648729 0,55314947
26 0,34582365 0,183414944 0,29093068 0,57232473
27 0,240793303 0,095145385 (*) 0,31055511 0,58219669
28 0,237790635 0,05394625 (*) 0,23634992 0,64450727
29 0,256062484 0,066752148 (*) 0,26371494 0,56301771
30 0,287604676 0,078019286 (*) 0,31225518 0,6101801
31 0,304621415 0,084009667 (*) 0,17175076 0,63283584
32 0,351037739 0,068722687 (*) 0,21666136 0,66842683
33 0,430488787 0,030979123 (**) 0,19001173 0,60041813
34 0,323327521 0,037391645 (**) 0,20276327 0,4491228
35 0,382039819 0,047191041 (**) 0,21577365 0,51902584
36 0,416538139 0,06203028 (*) 0,28491049 0,59522962
37 0,372597818 0,048604594 (**) 0,3457867 0,64356775
38 0,338034268 0,063456198 (*) 0,34249047 0,5963476
39 0,396318518 0,058405243 (*) 0,38061615 0,66967157
40 0,495941266 0,088867035 (*) 0,36105436 0,66905946
41 0,542324527 0,103970565 0,29264415 0,61201793
42 0,541478598 0,116171941 0,288961493 0,628036971
43 0,644344267 0,140355951 0,313112965 0,490278682
44 0,671988823 0,177297033 0,328375827 0,301752567
45 0,679684175 0,176128172 0,381071427 0,378249716
46 0,701319475 0,168796663 0,367731711 0,440590805
47 0,756203404 0,164090536 0,324231073 0,440508745
48 0,779422274 0,156580075 0,386995982 0,412768759
49 0,769613133 0,152564841 0,426050014 0,318286558
50 0,817863866 0,174490059 0,435762243 0,256048584
p <0,1 (*); p <0,05(**); p <0,01(***)
interpret the lag length and changes? For this we will take
the cognitive biases which Shiller sees as powerful enough
to influence people’s behavior away from reason [13].
The shifting of lag length has been proven in Table
I. There the significant lags deviated between the four
sequences of the time series. If we focus on Figure 1, we
can see that the distance between the sentiment and the
CDAX grows when the period before has been constantly
higher sentiment. When the sentiment reaches the peak
and drops afterward, the CDAX continues to grow. This
is consistent with Shiller’s argumentation. He calls this
detachment from fundamentals irrational exuberance. It
is a type of herd behavior, triggered by the information
cascade, where the additional information of the rational
investment decision of a primary investors group reacting
to a news leads to a second group reacting. This reaction of
the second group has the additional information of the first
group already investing, leading to irrational overestimation
and thus over-investing. This further detaches market
development from the declining news sentiment [39], [40].
Due to the mechanism of the emotional bias it is not likely
that this effect happens the other way around.
In this period, emotional bias lets people reject the
possible truth of dropping markets, if the result of accepting
it would be harmful for them. This can extend and
perpetuate herd behavior and the resulting growth periods
[41]. The downward correction after the extended period
of growth progresses bit by bit, as not all accept the
growth inversion immediately. For those investors who still
believe the ongoing growth, escalation of commitment lets
them commit even more firmly to their investments. This
self-perpetuating effect can even accelerate the creation of
a bubble. At the point where the majority has to accept the
evidence of a ’bubble’, the market collapses and adjusts
downwards, towards the news sentiment. The causality lag
shrinks from a length of up to seven months to around one
month.
We can identify this ’irrational exuberance’ driven growth
in the period before 2008 and again at the end of 2010 for
our data.
Based on studied biases in combinations with the
observations of repeating and explainable behavior we
would expect people, in times of crisis, to be more
receptive to good news than in times of growth to bad
news. We call this behavior, following Shiller, irrational
exuberance.
This knowledge will be used in the next chapter to create
an index displaying the found causality.
6. Sentiment to CDAX Index
In the previous chapters we have found sufficient evidence
to say that the market sentiment (y), which we extracted
from corporate news, Granger-causes the stock market, in
our case the CDAX (x). The task ahead is now, how to
translate the causality into a form, that shows the market
sentiment’s state and what kind of development the CDAX,
or the economy, can expect in the future.
As a trivial index, we could simply take the standardized
moving average of 29 or 100 days, sentiment values as
shown in Figure 1. Using this approach, the index would
assume a more or less average basic sentiment, which only
moves above or beyond when good or bad news breaks
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the market and returns if no further news is published.
We could simply read the market news sentiment as
its own standard deviation. This would be analogous to
the ifo growth expectations (Geschäftserwartungen) [11].
However, the analysis has been based on news from the
stock market, and should include the respective stock market
in the index. We will construct the index as an over- or
underpricing indicator for the related market. To indicate
whether the market is overpriced, meaning the stock market
(CDAX) would be above the sentiment for a point of time,
the index should be negative, due to its expected future
return to a lower level, and vice versa. For this concept of an
indicator of future development we can take the difference of
the standardized 29 days, moving average for the sentiment
(SX) and the standardized CDAX (CX),
STCI = SX − CX (8)
and model them over time, as done in Figure 3.
In doing so, we generate a new time series, which
displays the difference between CDAX and sentiment in the
differences of standard deviations. To ease the interpretation
we added a colored background, functioning as an indicator
of a market that is unreasonably detached from the sentiment
and its expected future development, with a green upper
area and a red area below. In this context red means that
the sentiment is lower than the CDAX and green illustrates
the opposite. If we assume that the sentiment reflects the
market’s fundamentals, we can claim that negative values
indicate overpricing (red) and positive values indicate under-
pricing (green). The colors in this context also indicate the
expected future development for the CDAX, since we expect
it to follow the sentiment after a lag. The area between -
1 and 1 is left uncolored, as we always see some minor
differences between the two time series, which mark no
significant exuberance.
Since this type of index displays the relation of the market
sentiment to the stock market itself we are calling this type
of index Sentiment to Stock Market Index, short STSMI. In
our case for the German stock market, CDAX, the index is
now referred to as Sentiment to CDAX Index (STCI).
7. Advantages and Usability of the Sentiment
to Stock Market Index
In the previous chapters we have analyzed the influence
of corporate announcements on the economy. We have
translated this causality into a model that illustrates the
difference between the news sentiment and economic
indices. However, of what use is this model or index
compared to already existing ones, such as the PMI, ifo or
ZEW indices and statistics issued by the government? The






























































































Figure 3. The Sentiment to CDAX Index with a Coloured Background
as an Overpricing (red) and Underpricing (green) Indicators
indices have in common.
• Real time analysis of the corporate announcements pro-
vides a completely new approach in measuring markets
sentiment.
• Low costs, since almost no work is needed to generate
and update the index.
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• The analyzed news are of regulatory nature and for
all companies obligatory, resulting in an stable and
independent news input.
• Less vulnerable to falsifying survey answers, thus un-
biased.
• Data is expected to be unbiased and not yet translated
into prices.
The indices’ core usability is to identify over- or
underpricing of aggregated stock markets and detect
exaggeration in growth expectations, irrational exuberance
[13]. The forecasting potential can be used to identify
future trends and emerging ’economic bubbles’. It is not
developed for daily trading even though it is updated
in real-time. Its forecasting potential is developed for
medium-term growth. However, this medium-term growth
expectation can change within a period of one day, with
every breaking announcement.
8. Research Outlook
The basic idea of analyzing market behavior through news
sentiment, as done by Hagenau [16] and similarly developed
by Tetlock [14] [24] as well as in this paper has been
shown to be a reliable indicator for future development.
Nevertheless, we have investigated in this paper a time
interval which was shaped by devastating bubbles, crises
and recessions. To generalize the index further, we should
extend the time interval to less volatile times. Furthermore,
other markets and sub-markets could be analyzed in a
similar fashion to confirm a general causality, transferable
to a generalized approach implementing STSMIs globally.
It would also be possible to test for different news reception
over time, in this and other markets, by using more
advanced rolling window Granger-causality tests. Possible
research could also include feedback loops and unit root
tests, to investigate staggering effects of sentiment on the
CDAX. In addition to this it would be interesting to see
if our results can be matched by an data-driven sentiment
analysis approach.
9. Conclusion
In conclusion, the sentiment of corporate announcements has
proven to have a strong influence on the development of
stock markets, as we proposed in research question 1. We
have seen that not only stock markets are news driven, but
also that the reception of news is news driven. Long periods
of positive news make people over-anticipate the future
development of prices. If those prices adjust downwards, the
market and also its participants go through more stressful
times. The consequence of this phenomenon is that the
market’s development is closer to that of the news sentiment.
This leads to a simple conclusion: happiness (or greed)
compels people to turn away from reason. This should
not come as a surprise. Nonetheless, the sentiment values
reflect a stable relation to the CDAX with psychologically
explained lag shifts (RQ 3). These lag shifts, indicate over-
or underpricing/underestimation of the market’s status. The
Sentiment to CDAX Index indicates when our assumption of
aggregated market value is not reflected in the news we read
of those companies we value through market prices. We can
not give a definite answer to research question 2 regarding
the length of the delay, since the lag is not constant, as
explained in the interpretation. Nevertheless, the change in
lag length can be expected to follow the rules of ’irrational
exuberance’ and is, along with the STCI, an indicator for
future development and current over- or underestimation of
the market.
The approach that Hagenau proposes, and which we
adapted, was proven to be a reliable method capturing
market sentiment. We have developed it into a non-survey-
based sentiment index which compensates for the problems
seen in conventional sentiment capturing approaches. It
surpasses conventional methods in terms of usability and
especially as an early warning signal, still offering a wide
psychological and statistical base. The future will show
how effective and accurate the STCI is in non-crisis-times
and how market participants will adapt to news sentiment
analysis.
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